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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the de/motivation variables in the delivery of housing 
microfinance (HMF) in the low-income housing market in Ghana. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper relied on a survey of 125 respondents of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) to understand the interactions and effects of these variables on HMF delivery in Ghana. Descriptive and 
bivariate statistical methods were used to analyse the data. 
Findings – The findings revealed that both internal and external variables motivate MFIs to engage in the low-
income housing market. These variables are: MFIs desire for expansion, the potential size of the low-income housing 
market, the market potential for MFIs growth, the availability of local resources, unique features and products of the 
market, low-income housing offering an opportunity for leveraging resources and the preference for homeownership 
than rental among individuals in the low-income segment of the population. However, variables such as capital lock-
up in HMF delivery, high-interest rates in the country, high cost and land prices, high cost and price of building 
materials, lack of sufficient collaterals and the different interest rates required on HMF loans also served as 
demotivation in the low-income housing market in Ghana. 
Research limitations/implications – The paper findings are limited in context to Ghana. 
Practical implications – The paper, although limited to Ghana, contributes to the much-needed body of knowledge 
on low-income housing finance in developing countries. 
Originality/value – The paper is the first of its kind in using empirical data to explore the motivational and 
demotivational variables in the delivery of HMF in a developing country context such as Ghana. 
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1. Introduction 
The growth of the housing market in developing countries has in recent times been of great 
concern and interest to many stakeholders including researchers. The interest in the growth of the 
housing market is because of its economic contribution to the overall Gross Domestic Product 
and economic growth in these emerging markets (Stiglitz, 1993; Calvo et al., 1996). As such, the 
provision of low-income housing is no longer considered as a social obligation by the state, but 
as a means of economic growth and poverty reduction (cf. Jack and Braimah, 2004; Nima, 2004). 
Furthermore, the importance of low-income housing market in contributing to job creation and 
the overall output growth of a country economy is also widely accepted in both developed and 
emerging markets (cf. Keivani and Werna, 2001; Buckley and Kalarickal, 2005). The process of 
transformation and expansion of such an important sector of the economy from the individual 
low-income groups to the national and global perspectives is also attracting much interest within 
and outside the housing market.  
  
Moreover, the development of low-income housing market in developing economies is also seen 
as an avenue to accelerate the achievement of wider economic and socioeconomic objectives that 
includes poverty reduction by many stakeholders (Krieger and Higgins 2002; Bondinuba, 2016). 
The provision of jobs and the use of housing and its related activities for business growth and 
family unionisations is another benefit of the housing market in developing countries (Sengupta, 
2013; Lerbs, 2014). Furthermore, the housing market in many emerging markets such as Ghana, 
although not well structured, operates on two levels: formal and informal market segments (cf. 
Keivani and Werna, 2001; Arku et al., 2012). The informal housing market constitutes the largest, 
and its products are mostly low-income housing provided through the support of families, friends 
and to a large extent by the individual home builder. Low-income housing is arguably a non-
specific expression used to refer to the type of housing that is within the means of low-income 
earners, usually in developing countries. Low-income housing assumes the characteristics of 
supply side oriented financing by a combination of public and private funding which targets the 
low-income groups of the society (Bondinuba et al., 2013). Many professionals, artisans and 
labourers are informally employed in this sector. The informal housing market can, therefore, be 
considered as having the potential of providing a large percentage of both manufacturing and 
service employment particularly in Ghana. Despite the importance and benefits of this sector, 
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many poverty-stricken households and individuals who constitute the larger proportion of this 
market are unable to access finance on a sustainable basis to meet their housing needs. Such 
segment, therefore, becomes the largest underserved regarding access to housing finance in the 
entire housing market in Ghana. 
 
Growth-oriented MFIs, having realised the potential of such an important but untapped market, 
has started making the most tangible contribution towards economic growth and job creation in 
the private sector of these economies where they operate. They do so through the provision of 
competitive and innovative products such as HMF in two ways. The first tangible contribution is 
that they act as leading agents or subcontractors of both multilateral and bilateral donor funding 
organisations or their respective local governments (Bondinuba, 2016). Secondly, they also act as 
venture firms in their own rights (Quaye et al., 2014). A large number of MFIs have emerged in 
recent times in many emerging economies including Ghana, to serve the unsatisfied demand for 
financial services—particularly to meet various needs of the low-income groups which include 
housing. These institutions usually focus on providing other services to individuals and small 
businesses in either one or the combinations of credit provision and deposit collection (Basu et 
al., 2004).   
 
However, the Ghanaian housing literature has been skewed towards mainstream mortgage 
financing with less focus on the advancements of low-income housing finance such as HMF 
delivery (cf. Tipple et al., 1999; Arku et al., 2012; Obeng-Odoom, 2013; Nimako and Bondinuba, 
2013; Yankson and Gough, 2014; Afrane et al., 2014). These studies are mostly in the context of 
housing policies, rental issues and the demand and supply of housing in Ghana. Little is known 
about the variables that serve as motivations to MFIs that engage in the low-income housing 
market and vice versa. The above indicates a general lack of knowledge regarding the broader 
implications of these variables for the low-income groups and the institutions engaging in such 
markets. Furthermore, since the publication of most of the above studies, the scope of the 
Ghanaian housing market has changed significantly, especially regarding housing demand and 
supply. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to identify and evaluate the variables that motivate 
entry and non-entry of MFIs into the low-income segment of the housing market in Ghana. It 
adopted a quantitative research strategy with a survey of 125 respondent MFIs in Ghana. The 
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paper is structured into five sections with Section 2 dwelling on the concept of HMF in the low-
income housing market. Section 3 describes the research approach and data analyses, while 
Section 4 contains the discussion of the findings and their implications. Section 5 concludes the 
paper and recommends potential areas for future research. 
2.0 The Concept of Housing Microfinance in the Low-income Housing Market 
The concept of HMF emerged from microfinance as an innovative financing strategy with its 
high potential hitherto untapped. As such, MFIs which provide HMF continues to strive toward 
providing accessible and affordable finance on a sustainable basis to low-income groups of the 
population in emerging markets (Pedrini et al., 2016; Bondinuba, 2016). This effort by MFIs 
particularly is to enable low-income earners in developing countries to meet their housing needs 
(Bondinuba et al., 2016).  This is because HMF works on the principles and concepts of how 
most individual low-income groups are housed through the incremental building process. To 
better understand HMF delivery, Daphnis and Ferguson (2004) described it as the intersection 
between housing finance and microfinance. Ritchie (2011) also suggested that it is the 
combination of pro-poor real estate development using microfinance principles with emphasis on 
housing support services and community development. In this regard, (Bondinuba, 2016)  also 
noted that HMF refers to the application and use of microfinance services, strategies and products 
to meet the housing needs of individual low-income groups as well as attempting to address the 
housing value chain constraints of low-income housing based on the concepts of microfinance 
approaches. This paper adopts the definition of Bondinuba, (2016) for this study.  
 
The concept in its entirety is a new and an innovative strategy in many emerging markets’ 
housing finance sectors which operate on a 2- way approach (Malhotra, 2002; Daphnis and 
Ferguson, 2004). Individual low-income groups can either access cash loans for home 
improvement, or they can get skills on how to build their housing and through loaned 
construction materials (Littlefield et al., 2003; Kono and Takahashi, 2010).  Furthermore, HMF is 
a more appropriate lending method and strategy for serving the housing finance needs of 
individual low-income groups than traditional mortgage lending (Schumman, 2004; Cain, 2007). 
This is because HMF guarantees flexibility of access and repayment terms. There is flexibility 
due to the small nature of the amount that is usually given out for the incremental building 
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process of individual low-income groups. Collateralisation issues until recently have also not 
been much of a problem in HMF design and delivery (Derban et al., 2002). HMF programs also 
have the potential of being integrated into any MFI’s existing micro enterprise operations without 
any adverse effect on the quality or growth of the existing portfolio (Daphnis and Ferguson, 
2004). Furthermore, it would be very easy for any MFI’s existing loan or credit officer to be 
trained to offer HMF loans without any difficulties or negatively affecting their productivity 
(Ferguson and Smets, 2010).  MFIs which adopt, design and develop HMF for the low-income 
housing market would be contributing to the innovation and entrepreneurship efforts in both 
housing and microfinance industries.  
However, in the case of developing countries and from individual low-income group’s 
perspectives, the success of delivering HMF borders on affordability issues. Affordability is 
affected by individuals’ income status which compels them to build incrementally over a long 
period. Evidence suggests that about 33% of Ghanaians resort to alternative arrangements such as 
living with relatives, living in informal housing on undeveloped land or living in tents, kiosks, 
containers or shops due to the shortage and lack of affordable housing in the country (CAHF, 
2015; Bondinuba, 2016). CAHF (2015) estimates that about 96.6% of the Ghanaian population 
rely on affordable housing finance mechanisms to attain home ownership. Moreover, the 
Ministry of Water, Resources, Works and Housing, reported in 2013 that the country’s housing 
deficit was around 1.7 million units. The most widely affected by the housing deficit is the low-
income segment of the population. Likewise, both rural and urban average household incomes are 
insufficient to purchase the cheapest newly built house, constructed by formal developers 
(Sarfoh, 2010; CAHF, 2015). Only 3.4 percent of the population could practically purchase 
houses built by a formal developer. The Ghanaian housing market thus favours self-built 
solutions.  Kwofie et al. (2011) also indicate that as much as 90% of housing in Ghana is self-
built. This is commonly financed through accumulated savings, home loans from non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), microfinance institutions and support from relatives 
(Awuvafoge, 2013; Bondinuba et al., 2014). 
The above phenomena are as results of low income, higher cost of land, among others, which 
raise affordability issues (Karley, 2008). The Ghana National Shelter Policy, (2015), defines 
affordability as being relative to household gross annual income. Affordability regarding housing 
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consumption requires a household to spend no more than 30 percent of its gross annual income 
from the rental or purchase of housing (Karley, 2008; Boamah, 2010). However, in the case of 
Ghana, the lower social, economic segment of the population spend more than 30% of the annual 
gross income on housing and its related cost (Boamah, 2010).   
2.1 The Role of Microfinance Institutions in Housing Microfinance Delivery 
One basic feature of most HMF schemes is that they involve the collaboration among the public, 
private and other third-party institutions and organisations. HMF delivery involves risk sharing 
relationship in joint decision-making, financial and technical resource commitment as well as 
benefits from the comparative and interdependence among the parties and stakeholders. Prior 
studies indicate that the design and application of HMF consist of networks of heterogeneous 
inter-dependent actors (cf. Ferguson and Navarrete, 2003; Chakrabarti, 2004; Daphnis and 
Ferguson, 2004). These actors evolve around governance and socio-economic development 
perspectives through the principle of savings and loans to alleviate poverty among the urban and 
rural poor.  The collaborations and partnerships consist of values, processes and institutions 
which aim at addressing the complex social issues such as poverty and other human livelihood 
challenges. Institutions in this context relate to the system of interactions and interdependent 
organisations usually put together by the state or private sector actors or investors for 
collaborations within established norms, rules and constitutions (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; 
Kumar, 2004). These institutions, in the case of MFIs, play a significant role in the progress, 
development and stability of society (Coase, 1998). In low-income housing provisions, (UNCHS, 
1996; Habitat, 2006), identified institutions as vital components in the formulation, 
implementation and monitoring of housing policies and programmes while ensuring community 
and societal development. Madu and Umebali (1993) also demonstrated the role of indigenous 
institutions in capital and community resource mobilisation in emerging economies. The role and 
consequences of the interactions among institutions such as MFIs generate diverse settings which 
may be linked to the formation, composition and socioeconomic characteristics of themselves 
(Akinola, 2007; Srnec et al., 2013). Hence, Klijn and Teisman (2002) suggest that the structure 
and socioeconomic characteristics of an institution and the contextual situations in which they 
operate determine the outcomes of their interactions within a system such as the low-income 
housing value chain.  
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However, many use the term microfinance institution and ‘micro credit institution’ 
interchangeably. Ahmed et al. (2013. p 211) therefore proposed that for an MFI to qualify and be 
accorded as such it must be considered to be “social enterprise whose primary mission is to 
improve the lives of poor people through the provision of financial services”. They argued that 
any profit-seeking institution could also be classified as such so far as it does satisfy the above 
criteria. Such institutions must adhere and adopt the philosophy of ‘double bottom line’ approach, 
which is more focus on improving the lives of the low-income groups of the population. Social 
enterprise according to (Yunus, 2007) is a non-loss, non-dividend enterprise, created with the 
intention to do good to people, to bring positive change to the world, without any short-term 
expectation of making money. In this context, HMF loans are supposed to be carried out without 
collateral, and the lender has no legal recourse to recover a loan if the borrower is unable to 
repay. The above definitions may remove the MFI label from many legitimate institutions 
operating as MFIs in developing countries including Ghana. It may also affect those offering 
collateralized loans to small and medium enterprises and low-income earners. Most profit-
seeking MFIs, whose main objective is to be loyal to their shareholders, may not also, be 
considered as MFIs unless their work aimed at benefitting the poor.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, MFIs whether they operate as profit or non-profit seeking institutions 
would be motivated to be efficient and manage their HMF portfolios based on certain 
motivations. These motivations could be positive or negative forces which exist in the low-
income housing market. An understanding of these forces is helpful for MFIs to be conversant 
with the motivations of individual low-income groups in patronising their products within the 
context of the role they perform in the housing value chain. However, Bondinuba et al. (2014) 
suggested that motivating individual low-income groups as clients would be one of the most 
complex concepts for MFIs particularly in developing countries such as Ghana. This is because 
of the complexities and non-permanency of most urban individual low-income groups who 
migrate internally within the urban centres. Furthermore, understanding the motivation would 
steer MFIs to innovate and become more productive, therefore ensuring organisational survival 
(Bondinuba, 2015). Understanding the de/motivation variables would help MFIs to aim at scaling 
up profitably. It can also contribute to sustaining the organisation and HMF portfolio as well as 
the housing market. Moreover, MFIs would better enhance their organisational or corporate 
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image and ensure better inter-industrial relations with microfinance and housing markets 
(Bondinuba, 2016). More importantly, motivation would drive MFIs to be acceptable to change 
and ensure a better-quality orientation and better productivity in the delivery of HMF to 
individual low-income groups. It is on the above premise that this paper sought to discover the 
variables within the low-income housing market that serve as de/motivation to MFIs which may 
consider delivering HMF to individual low-income groups in Ghana. 
 
3.0 Research Approach and Data Analysis 
The study used quantitative data from questionnaire research techniques to achieve the research 
aim. The study adopted a broader view of the de/motivational variables for MFIs entry and non-
entry into the low-income housing market in Ghana. The motivation for using questionnaire was 
to be able to reach a target group in a more practical and efficient way. A predetermined question 
response options were used among a cross-section of non-HMF providing institutions. This was 
to eliminate any possible bias associated with interviews and to obtain a wider view of 
respondents from the Ghanaian microfinance industry. The study used thirteen, and twelve of the 
demotivation and motivation variables developed from both extant literature and interviews with 
three housing microfinance institution in Ghana (cf. Panayotou, 2002; Smets, 2006; Cain, 2007; 
BOG, 2007; Yunus, 2007; Daphnis and Ferguson, 2004; Metzel, 2009; Ritchie, 2011; Littlefield 
et al., 2003; Kono and Takahashi, 2010; Schumman, 2004; Cain, 2007; Ferguson and Navarrete, 
2003; Chakrabarti, 2004; Daphnis and Ferguson, 2004; Bondinuba et al., 2014; Bondinuba, 
2015). Part one of the questionnaires sought the general information about respondents and their 
organisations. Part two asked respondents to state their level of agreement with the 25 variables 
as possible demotivation and motivations associated with the delivery of HMF using a five-point 
Likert scale of 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree.  
 
3.1 The Data Collection Process 
The questionnaires were administered to MFIs in the Greater Accra and Ashanti regions. In total, 
200 questionnaires were distributed to MFIs: 120 and 80 in Greater Accra and Ashanti regions 
respectively.  This was because many MFIs operating in the country are in these regions. 
Furthermore, it was also due to their strategic importance regarding their socio-economic 
activities, population and volume of construction activities. The survey was conducted between 
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August 2014 and December 2014 as part of a postgraduate research study. Snowball sampling 
was used to identify respondent institutions from the population because a “standard” sampling 
approach was difficult and uneconomical. Using this method, easy to reach MFIs were 
approached to participate. The results yielded a sample of 200 MFIs from which 135 completed 
questionnaires were received as shown in Table 1. The summary of the survey data indicates that 
a response rate of 68% was achieved.  However, 7% of the responses were unusable due to errors, 
inconsistencies and incompleteness. The above results could be considered as good since prior 
studies suggest that variations in the nonresponse rates do not necessarily change or affect 
surveys (Keeter et al., 2000; Merkle and Edelman, 2002). The important thing to do as a 
researcher is to minimise the nonresponse rates.  Babbie (2007, p. 262) is also emphatic in his 
view about response rate of survey research. He argues that extant literature on social science 
indicates that “a response rate of at least 50 percent is considered adequate, 60 percent is good 
[and] 70 percent is very good” for analysing and reporting context. To increase the response rate, 
respondents were contacted by telephone to obtain their office locations and directions before 
sending the surveys out. Follow-up reminders through phone calls almost every week also 
facilitated the response rate that was recorded.  
 
Table 1. Questionnaire distribution within the regions 
Distribution 
within regions 
Number 
distributed 
Percentage 
(%) 
Nr Collected Percentage 
(%) 
Nr found suitable 
for analysis 
Percentage (%) 
Greater Accra 120 60.0 80 59.3 74 59.2 
Ashanti  80 40.0 55 40.7 51 40.8 
Total 200 100.0 135 100.0 125 100.0 
 
3.2 Preliminary Analysis 
Data collected were analysed using descriptive statistics with the help of the statistical package 
for social sciences (SPSS) version 22 software. The 25 de/motivator variables were analysed 
using mean, standard deviation and ranking strategy to extract the critical variables among them. 
Furthermore, agreement on the rankings of the variables was tested using the Mann-Whitney U-
test. Reliability is the extent to which data collection and analytical techniques yield consistent 
findings. To demonstrate the reliability of the questionnaire survey, the Cronbach’s coefficient 
was used to examine the internal consistency of the scale (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). A 
Cronbach’s α value greater than 0.70 is widely considered as sufficient (Pallant, 2010). Both 
standardised and non-standardised Cronbach’s α computed gave the same value of 0.82 as shown 
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in Table 2 below. It means all the variables are reliable. The content validity of the questionnaire 
was based on the literature review and interviews as stated above as well as the subjective 
opinions of two HMF experts. Therefore, the content validity of the questionnaire was also 
achieved.  
Table 2. The Cronbach’s α Value 
Scale Statistics Reliability Statistics 
Nr of 
Variables 
Mean Variance S. D Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized 
Items 
25 137.66 177.02 13.31 0.82 0.82 
 
3.3 General Characteristics of Respondents’ Institutions 
A breakdown of the respondents who participated in the survey shows that out of the 125 
respondents who returned the valid questionnaires, 59% of them are in the Greater Accra region 
while 41% are in the Ashanti region as shown in Table 1. Respondents from Greater Accra region 
were (19%, n=25) higher than those in the Ashanti region. Although Ashanti region is noted for 
its variety of businesses, the Greater Accra region currently has the largest share of the Ghanaian 
population with about 4.0 million (GSS 2013). Regarding respondent institutions knowledge 
concerning HMF delivery, 18% had a sound understanding but were however not engaged in 
HMF delivery for various reasons. Among these reasons includes high risks in term of capital 
locked-up and the high financial capital outlays required to undertake such a venture. 
 
Table 3.  Respondents’ firms’ knowledge of housing microfinance 
Valid Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 22 17.6 17.6 17.6 
No 103 82.4 82.4 100.0 
Total 125 100.0 100.0  
 
Regarding firm characteristics, four variables characterised the chosen firms surveyed as shown 
in Table 4 below. These variables were the firms’ years of operation, the source of finance, 
annual income and target clients. Considering the firm's years of operation, about 54% (n=68) 
have operated for less than five years, while 2% (n=2) operated between 20 -24 years. The above 
shows that majority of them firms, 86% (n=108) started operating less than a decade. Whereas 
majority 44% (n=55) relied on the contribution from their partners, a minority of them get their 
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source of funding from donor agencies 2% (n=3). Regarding annual income, about 27% (n=34) 
earned above Gh¢ 40,001 while 6% (n=8) earned between Gh¢30,001 to Gh¢ 40,000 per annum1. 
Furthermore, 42% (n=53) of the firms target the low-income group's while 38% (n=47) target all 
categories of income earners in the country.  
 
Table 4. Firm Characteristics 
S/N Variables Categories Frequency Percent 
1 Years of operation Less than 5 years 68 54.40 
5 - 9 years 40 32.00 
10 - 14 years 6 4.80 
15 - 19 years 5 4.00 
20 - 24 years 2 1.60 
25 years and above 4 3.20 
Total 125 100.00 
2 Source of finance Bank loans 26 20.80 
Contribution of Partners 55 44.00 
Borrowers savings 24 19.20 
Share capital 17 13.60 
Donor agencies/gov't 3 2.40 
Total 125 100.00 
3 Firms' annual income* Less than Gh¢ 10,000.00 26 20.80 
Gh¢ 10,001.00 - 20,000.00 26 20.80 
Gh¢ 20,001.00 - 30,000.00 31 24.80 
Gh¢ 30,001.00 - 40,000.00 8 6.40 
Above Gh¢ 40,001.00 34 27.20 
Total 125 100.00 
4 Target income groups Low-income groups 53 42.40 
Middle-income groups 22 17.60 
Upper-income groups 3 2.40 
All 47 37.60 
Total 125 100.0 
 
 
3.4 The De/Motivation Variables in Housing Microfinance Delivery  
The full list of the de/motivation variables used for the paper is presented in Table 5, and their 
effects are discussed in Section 4.0 below. The first set of variables is the demotivation variables. 
They were evaluated, and it emerged that seven out of thirteen variables were considered relevant 
and they can deter MFIs from entering the low-income housing market. Respondents were 
impartial on six of these variables. However, their position could as well be interpreted as being 
                                                          
1 As at August 24, 2016 (the time of writing), Gh¢ 1 = € 0,2250 = £ 0,1912 = $ 0,2533.  
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agreed upon looking at the mean values recorded for those variables which are all above 3.0. The 
seven most important demotivation variables in order of importance were capital lock-up in HMF 
delivery (4.85), high-interest rates in the country (4.19), high cost and price of land (4.16), 
ineffective collateral registry (4.14), high cost and price of building materials  (4.12), lack of 
sufficient collaterals from individual low-income groups (4.10) and the different interest rate 
required on HMF loans (4.06).  
The second twelve set of motivation variables likely to attract MFIs into the low-income housing 
market were also evaluated using the mean scores as relatively important. The results show that 
respondents agreed on seven variables being significant motivation variables. The least average 
score among them was 3.95. These variables in order of importance are MFIs firms desire for 
expansion (4.44), the potential size of the low-income housing market  (4.31), potential market 
for MFIs growth (4.21), availability of local resources (4.15), the unique features and products of 
the housing market (4.14), market opportunity for leveraging resources (4.10), and individual 
low-income groups preference for homeownership over renting (4.02). Respondents were 
impartial concerning MFIs appetite for profit and high demand for low-income housing. 
Furthermore, respondents could not agree on issues such as flexibility of entry, the flexibility of 
risks and knowledge sharing and good policy towards homeownership as motivation variables. 
These results and their effects are discussed in section 4.0. 
 
Table 5. The De/Motivation Measurement Variables in HMF delivery in the low-income housing 
market 
Coding The Measurement Variables Nr Mean SD SKN Rank Remarks 
Demotivations 
Demo3 Capitals lock-up 125 4.45 0.80 -1.76 1st Agreed 
Demo9 High interest rates 125 4.19 0.84 -1.21 2nd Agreed 
Demo4 High cost and price of land 125 4.16 0.87 -1.20 3rd Agreed 
Demo8 Ineffective collateral registry 125 4.14 1.03 -1.12 4th Agreed 
Demo6 High cost and prices of building materials 125 4.12 0.89 -1.34 5th Agreed 
Demo7 Lack of sufficient collaterals 125 4.10 0.93 -1.30 6th Agreed 
Demo10 Unequal interest charges 125 4.06 1.16 -1.12 7th Agreed 
Demo12 Lack of funding 125 3.89 1.01 -0.63 8th Neutral 
Demo5 Lack of security and tenure 125 3.85 1.07 -0.57 9th Neutral 
Demo13 Low income levels of low income group 125 3.70 0.93 -0.24 10th Neutral 
Demo2 HMF delivery is risky 125 3.67 1.13 -0.67 11th Neutral 
Demo11 Higher interest rate on HMF 125 3.57 1.19 -0.55 12th Neutral 
Demo1 High fold-up rates among MFIs 125 3.47 1.18 -0.16 13th Neutral 
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Motivations 
Moti7 Firms desire for expansion 125 4.44 0.76 -1.62 1st Agreed 
Moti1 Potential size of the low-income housing 
market  
125 4.31 0.88 -1.59 2nd Agreed 
Moti8 Potential market for MFIs growth 125 4.21 0.86 -1.28 3rd Agreed 
Moti5 Availability of local resources 125 4.15 0.74 -1.22 4th Agreed 
Moti6 Unique features and products of the market 125 4.14 0.78 -1.09 5th Agreed 
Moti9 Market opportunity for leveraging resources 125 4.10 1.03 -1.19 6th Agreed 
Moti3 Preference for homeownership than renting 125 4.02 0.99 -1.19 7th Agreed 
Moti4 Appetite to increase firm profit 125 3.98 0.99 -0.98 8th Neutral 
Moti2 High demand for low-income housing  125 3.95 1.08 -0.98 9th Neutral 
Moti11 Flexibility of entry 125 2.03 1.07 1.02 10th Disagree 
Moti12 Flexibility of risk and knowledge sharing 125 1.98 0.96 1.21 11th Disagree 
Moti10 Good policy towards homeownership 125 1.73 0.89 1.47 12th Disagree 
 
3.5 Correlation Analysis of the De/Motivation Variables in Housing Microfinance Delivery  
Further analysis was carried out to establish the possible and potential relationships among the 
identified variables. The Spearman’s Rho correlation was employed due to its less sensitivity to 
skewed data and outliers (Field 2009). Under the demotivation variables, the results show that 
there is a positive relationship between high cost and price of land and lack of sufficient 
collaterals [demo 4 and demo 7], (0.385, p < 0.01, n = 125). There is also a positive correlation 
between lack of security and tenure and high cost and prices of land [demo 5 and demo 4], 
(0.427, p < 0.01, n = 125). High cost and prices of building materials also correlates positively 
with lack of sufficient collateral [demo 6 and demo 7], (0.358, p < 0.01, n = 125), high cost and 
price of land [demo 6 and demo 4] (0.320, p < 0.01, n = 125) and lack of security and tenure 
[demo 6 and demo 5], (0.250, p < 0.01, n = 125). Lack of funding for MFIs also correlates 
positively with lack of security and tenure [demo 12 and demo 5], (0.225, p < 0.01, n = 125) and 
high cost and prices of building materials [demo 12 and demo 6], (0.316, p < 0.01, n = 125). 
Moreover, low income also correlates positively with lack of sufficient collateral [demo 13 and 
demo 7], (0.193, p < 0.05, n = 125), lack of security and tenure [demo 13 and demo 5], (0.274, p 
< 0.01, n = 125), high cost and prices of building materials [demo 13 and demo 6], (0.232, p < 
0.01, n = 125) and lack of funding [demo 13 and demo 12], (0.294, p < 0.01, n = 125). The 
results show that all the demotivation variables have a positive relationship with one or two 
variables. The strongest positive relationships among them are between high fold-up rates among 
MFIs and the delivery of HMF being a very risky venture in the low-income housing market 
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[demo 1and demo 2], (0.510, p < 0.01, n = 125). The rest of the correlation metrics are shown in 
Table 6. 
 
The results in Table 7 also show that there is a positive relationship between high demand for 
low-income housing and the potential of the low-income housing market [Moti 2 and Moti 1], 
(0.522, p < 0.01, n = 125). There is also a positive correlation between individual low-income 
groups preference for homeownership and the potential size of the low-income housing market 
[Moti 3 and Moti 1], (0.372, p < 0.01, n = 125) and high demand for low-income housing [Moti 3 
and Moti 2], (0.526, p < 0.01, n = 125). Moreover, a positive relation exists between MFIs 
appetite for profit and the potential of the low-income housing market [Moti 4 and Moti 1], 
(0.238, p < 0.01, n = 125) and high demand for low-income housing [Moti 4 and Moti 2], (0.229, 
p < 0.01, n = 125). There is also a positive relationship between most of the motivation variables. 
Two variables-low-income housing market and the opportunity for leveraging resource correlates 
positively with all other variables. The correlations are shown in Table 7. 
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Table 6. The Correlation Analysis of the Demotivation Variables  
Correlations 
 Moti 1 Moti 2 Moti 3 Moti 4 Moti 5 Moti 6 Moti 7 Moti 8 Moti 9 Moti 10 Moti 11 Moti 12 
Spearman's rho Moti 1 Correlation Coefficient 1.000            
Sig. (2-tailed) .            
Moti 2 Correlation Coefficient .522** 1.000           
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .           
Moti 3 Correlation Coefficient .372** .526** 1.000          
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .          
Moti 4 Correlation Coefficient .238** .229* .164 1.000         
Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .010 .068 .         
Moti 5 Correlation Coefficient .234** .269** .125 .569** 1.000        
Sig. (2-tailed) .009 .002 .165 .000 .        
Moti 6 Correlation Coefficient .240** .217* .050 .461** .591** 1.000       
Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .015 .579 .000 .000 .       
Moti 7 Correlation Coefficient .172 .094 .201* .148 .185* .321** 1.000      
Sig. (2-tailed) .055 .296 .025 .099 .039 .000 .      
Moti 8 Correlation Coefficient .099 .187* .264** .152 .242** .272** .650** 1.000     
Sig. (2-tailed) .273 .037 .003 .090 .006 .002 .000 .     
Moti 9 Correlation Coefficient .283** .479** .266** .279** .356** .416** .184* .391** 1.000    
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .003 .002 .000 .000 .040 .000 .    
Moti 10 Correlation Coefficient -.019 .097 .093 -.025 .007 -.027 .089 .077 .055 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .834 .280 .302 .782 .938 .766 .323 .393 .541 .   
Moti 11 Correlation Coefficient .058 .115 .032 .059 .095 .099 .047 .005 .122 .508** 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .519 .203 .726 .515 .290 .273 .600 .956 .175 .000 .  
Moti 12 Correlation Coefficient .106 .145 .123 .051 .043 .061 -.002 -.007 .078 .304** .528** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .238 .108 .172 .569 .633 .499 .986 .936 .389 .001 .000 . 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7. The Correlation Analysis of the Motivation Variables  
Correlations 
 Demo 7 Demo 4 Demo 5 Demo 6 Demo 12 Demo 13 Demo 9 Demo 10 Demo 11 Demo 8 Demo 1 Demo 2 Demo 3 
Spearman's rho Demo 7 Correlation Coefficient 1.000             
Sig. (2-tailed) .             
Demo 4 Correlation Coefficient .385** 1.000            
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .            
Demo 5 Correlation Coefficient .174 .427** 1.000           
Sig. (2-tailed) .053 .000 .           
Demo 6 Correlation Coefficient .358** .320** .250** 1.000          
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .005 .          
Demo 12 Correlation Coefficient .154 .082 .225* .316** 1.000         
Sig. (2-tailed) .086 .361 .012 .000 .         
Demo 13 Correlation Coefficient .193* .106 .274** .232** .294** 1.000        
Sig. (2-tailed) .031 .240 .002 .009 .001 .        
Demo 9 Correlation Coefficient .269** .231** .154 .244** .276** .224* 1.000       
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .009 .087 .006 .002 .012 .       
Demo 10 Correlation Coefficient .173 .164 .043 .269** .204* .103 .309** 1.000      
Sig. (2-tailed) .054 .067 .632 .002 .023 .251 .000 .      
Demo 11 Correlation Coefficient .081 .234** .053 .259** .202* .195* .239** .432** 1.000     
Sig. (2-tailed) .371 .009 .558 .004 .024 .030 .007 .000 .     
Demo 8 Correlation Coefficient .264** .084 .109 .116 .155 .223* .238** .196* .155 1.000    
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .352 .226 .199 .084 .012 .007 .029 .085 .    
Demo 1 Correlation Coefficient .198* .165 .214* .357** .207* .085 .161 .053 .126 .131 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .027 .065 .017 .000 .020 .349 .073 .559 .163 .145 .   
Demo 2 Correlation Coefficient .020 .075 .091 .314** .400** .093 .079 .139 .308** .075 .510** 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .824 .406 .315 .000 .000 .305 .383 .121 .000 .405 .000 .  
Demo 3 Correlation Coefficient .142 .115 .140 .228* .379** .150 .255** .117 .104 .283** .154 .294** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .113 .200 .119 .011 .000 .096 .004 .195 .248 .001 .087 .001 . 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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4.0 Discussion of the Findings and Implications 
4.1 The effect of the demotivation variables on housing microfinance delivery 
There is a perceived high risk of default among individual low-income groups to traditional 
financial institutions. However, the situation of high defaults according to (Quaye et al. 2014) 
seems different with the microfinance industry. Thus, other MFIs have been able to succeed in 
the provision of financial assistance which aided individual low-income groups in Ghana to 
achieve financial independence progressively. This can be possible through their strong 
competency in the utilisation of scarce resources to effectively serve the informal sector. 
However, most MFIs are not willing to engage in the low-income housing market especially with 
HMF products due to many reasons. These reasons include lack of inadequate capital to finance 
low-income housing activities. This is because low-income housing activities require a 
significant capital outlay that is sometimes also locked-up. Coupled with the prevailing high 
interest rates on borrowing in Ghana, it is very difficult for most MFIs to consider new markets 
such as the low-income housing market even though such markets are perceived to be profitable.  
 
The results of the survey show that majority of MFIs operates in the Greater Accra region than in 
the Ashanti region with close to 18% of all the respondents having a sound knowledge about 
HMF in the country. The results demonstrate that there is little awareness among MFIs about the 
potential of both HMF as a product and that of the low-income housing market. Research and 
education are, therefore, fundamental to uncover the potential of both sub-sectors to MFIs and 
individual low-income groups in the country. Many MFIs offer micro savings than other products 
which go to buttress the point that most MFIs are operated by private concerns and individuals 
who aim at maximising profits out of the various low-income group's savings. MFIs by 
concentrating on micro savings escaped and passed on the risks involved in giving out 
microloans to individual low-income groups to meet their housing needs. Individual low-income 
groups often suffer the risks of losing their money in the event of bankruptcy of these companies. 
It is, therefore, safer and secure in taking savings than giving out credits when MFIs seems not to 
have any sustainable and secure source of funding. Only about 3% of the respondent 
organisations were involved in some form of HMF activities. They were probably compelled to 
do so due to some of their clients’ diverting enterprise loans into housing improvement as always 
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being the case. It is also evidenced that MFIs which offers HMF do so due to their source of 
funding and partner’s interest.  
 
Moreover, the general market situation in Ghana looks scary for most MFIs. The country macro 
economic environment affects the effective implementation of HMF programmes. As stated 
above, due to the market conditions and risk of non-payments, many MFIs priced their HMF 
portfolios to cater for such eventualities. This ultimately makes them very expensive and 
inaccessible to individual low-income groups. Moreover, the income levels of many individual 
low-income groups are low in the country in contrast to the cost of building a house. This is often 
because of high cost of materials and land, which consequently leads to high cost of construction 
that becomes unaffordable for individual low-income groups. Low-income is, therefore, a 
function of both individual low-income groups and MFIs motivation which also affect the 
affordability of HMF products and their delivery in the country.  Cultural issues also demotivate 
MFIs from adopting HMF for the housing market due to a perception in Ghana concerning 
gender and home ownership. Homeownership is skewed towards men. However, many MFIs 
target mostly women, and this serves as a demotivation. Regulatory framework and building 
codes are also potential demotivators in the delivery of HMF in the country. Other important 
issues such as high cost and delay of licensing or building permit process (permits for the use of 
the space, location permits, and land certification) are equally demotivating to MFIs in the 
country. These and unreliable title documentations intensify the risk of HMF lending, which 
explains why some MFIs in Ghana often shy away from lending to individual low-income groups 
to meet their needs or do so at a very high premium.  
4.2 The effect of the motivation variables on housing microfinance delivery 
The perceived motivation that would make most MFIs to be engaged in the low-income housing 
market would mainly be about profitability in both microfinance and low-income housing 
sectors. With profit-maximizing options as key, producing and selling more of housing products 
or units, reducing the cost of production through local raw materials and labour cost per housing 
unit would have normally been given priority by MFIs. However, this has not been the case as 
most MFIs motivations could be linked to some internal and external variables and processes. 
These variables and processes stimulate their desires and drive them to be continually interested 
and committed to pursuing certain goals or course of action. Therefore, they would usually 
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employ persistent efforts in attaining these firm goal(s). MFIs internal motivation variables which 
can be considered as influential are the firm’s desire for expansion, the appetite for profit and 
growth. Others are the firm structure, business interest, strategy and resources. The influential 
external variables include the potential size of the low-income housing market, the potential 
market for MFIs growth; availability of local resources to support HMF delivery; unique features 
and products of the market and the market opportunity for leveraging resources in both sectors. 
These variables collectively will either pull or attract MFIs into the low-income housing markets 
depending on their severities and other conditions. Interestingly, many MFIs have also 
acknowledged that the low-income housing market is large enough to accommodate both 
traditional, universal banks and MFIs. Such accession serves as motivation to other MFIs which 
can make a significant stride in the market. In many cases, they could be motivated by variables 
which include their corporate mission of meeting the socio-economic needs of the urban poor 
through the provision of housing, the potential of the housing market and MFIs willingness to 
enhance their corporate image and create employment for the urban and rural poor.  
 
In a much broader perspective, the intrinsic motivation by MFIs to provide a stable and safe 
livelihood through the housing as well as offering financial security to individual low-income 
groups would constitute one of their safety needs. The safety needs of individual low-income 
groups in the delivery of HMF by MFIs would help generate a feeling of acceptance, sense of 
belongingness within the communities where they operate. The use of HMF in delivering low-
income housing would also reinforce team dynamics among individual low-income groups. 
Additionally, meeting the social needs of individual low-income groups through the provision of 
housing would help MFIs recognise their achievements in the housing product delivered and 
assign priorities to other valuable products. This would also provide status and rewards that 
would make MFIs customers feel valued and appreciated. Under esteem motivation perspective, 
the delivery of HMF would offer a challenging and meaningful work assignment which would 
enable innovation, creativity, and progress by the long-term goals of MFIs. Furthermore, the 
participation of individual low-income groups in their housing decision making would offer job 
flexibility and autonomy among them and thereby enhance their self-actualization. The driving 
force of motivation in MFIs would help puts human and financial resources to action which 
would intend builds a friendly relationship between MFIs and individual low-income groups. It 
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would also possibly foster a mutual partnership between MFIs, individual low-income groups, 
the community and the state. In the case of individual low-income groups, motivation would help 
them achieve their personal or individual goals of building or improving their houses which will 
lead to personal self-esteem and satisfaction. It would also enhance skills and self-development 
of individual low-income groups since they would build through the incremental process by 
working with or in groups of dynamic teams.  An understanding of these sectors activities in the 
country is still low among practitioners and the research community.  The implications of the 
above findings are that the interactions between these two important submarkets in Ghana 
economy need a careful and systematic study. 
5.0 Conclusion 
Over the years existing literature on housing finance in emerging markets context has very little 
empirical work around HMF for low-income housing delivery. This paper provides an empirical 
framework for understanding some dimensions of HMF delivery relevant to MFIs, individual 
low-income groups, policy makers and investors. One major contribution of this paper is that it 
has evaluated the variables that are likely to deter and attract new MFIs into the low-income 
housing market by the adoption of HMF. It has therefore contributed to the extant literature on 
low income housing finance in developing countries. The study implies that within the low-
income housing finance domain, there are both de/motivation variables that could help explain 
the demand and supply phenomenon of HMF. The twenty-five variables could be used by 
management of MFIs as critical variables in evaluating their decisions in lending to individual 
low-income groups. 
 
The paper concludes that since HMF is quite new to the Ghanaian low-income housing market, 
the study views it as an innovative financing strategy. However, the demotivators outweighed the 
motivators which are not making the market attractive to many MFIs. Furthermore, HMF can 
provide the housing needs of a large segment of individual low-income groups if MFIs operate 
within a well-conceived competitive environment where there is the possibility of charging 
consumers the real cost and making a profit out of HMF. Stakeholders within the sector from 
both demand and supply sides must come together to form a united front through the efforts of 
Ghana Microfinance Institutions Network (GhaMFIN) to address some of the bottlenecks 
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identified. Proper engagement with state institutions on critical issues concerning land 
administration, management and provision of infrastructure remains vital in attracting many 
MFIs into the low-income housing market. 
 
It is however cautioned that the results of the present paper should be interpreted within the 
context of Sub-Sahara Africa, especially Ghanaian low-income housing market, and similar 
studies should be done in similar contexts in different countries to compare the results before 
generalisations could be made. Finally, the variables of each dimension of motivation identified 
for HMF delivery are not exhaustive. Different country-specific contexts may require 
modifications to the variables; the expansion of these variables could be grouped under each 
dimension as well as the inclusion of additional variables as knowledge keeps evolving and 
existing policies and practices keep changing. Therefore, future research should explore other 
critical factors in different developing countries for a better understanding of HMF delivery 
relevant to the low-income housing market. Further research is also required, concerning the risk, 
challenges and barriers to the adoption and delivery of HMF to individual low-income groups to 
meet their housing needs. There is also the need to study the low-income housing market 
dynamics in the country to understand the motivation behind individual low-income group’s 
decision to use HMF and vice versa. 
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